George Ronald Wright v. Westside Nursery, a Utah limited partnership, and Darrel Humphries, an individual : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
George Ronald Wright v. Westside Nursery, a Utah
limited partnership, and Darrel Humphries, an
individual : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary W. Pendleton; Attorney for Appellant.
Hans Q. Chamberlain; Chamberlain & Higbee; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation





K F U 
50 
DOCKET NO. fyQ&O'CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah 
limited partnership, and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an 
individual, 
Defendants and Appellees• 
Case No. 900300 CA 
Priority No. 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES PRESIDING 
Hans Q. Chamberlain (0607) 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
250 South Main 
P. O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Attorney for Appellee 
Gary W. Pendleton (2564) 
Attorney at Law 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorney for Appellant 
7 - § F S— 1 
»J 0 L a Lr rc ts= 
Jl'L 9 H 
C X ' R 1 ' Or APPEALS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT: 
I. WRIGHT WAS ENTITLED TO AND AWARDED COSTS 
ON THE PRIOR APPEAL 5 
II. HUMPHRIES HAS WAIAVED ANY OBJECTION TO 
WRIGHT'S BILL OF COSTS BY HIS FAILURE TO 
OBJECT THERETO 8 
III. THE DISTRICT OURT ERRED IDN REFUSING TO 
REDUCE THE ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED HUMPHRIES 
AT TRIAL 9 
CONCLUSION 10 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Everts v. Barker. 58 Utah 519, 200 P. 473 (1921) 8 
Everts v. Worrell. 58 Utah 238, 197 P. 1043 (1921) 7 
Family Medical Bldg. v. State, D.S.H.S., 
38 Wash.App. 738, 689 P.2d 413 (1984) 8 
RULES AND SECONDARY AUTHORITIES 
Rule 34, R.Utah Ct.App 6, 8 
Rule 34(d), R. Utah Ct. App 9 
i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah ] 
limited partnership, and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an ] 
individual, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
) Case No. 900300 CA 
Priority No. 14b 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the 
above-entitled court by provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A. 
1953 as amended. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff initiated this civil proceeding in the Fifth 
District Court and Defendants counterclaimed. Following trial and 
the denial of post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and for new trial, Plaintiff appealed seeking reversal of 
the judgment awarding Defendants damages for fraudulent 
misrepresentation and challenging other aspects of the proceedings. 
Defendants cross-appealed seeking the entry of judgment awarding 
damages for the wrongful termination of Defendant Humphries' 
employment contract and other relief. The prior appeal was before 
this Court as case no. 880544-CA. 
This Court reversed and vacated the judgment for damages 
arising out of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, affirmed 
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attorney tees awarded Humphries at trial? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of a 1 ] re] evant author it i es i s quoted i n the 
Utah Rules of Appe] late Procedure, togethei: wi th the aciu i sory 
committee's note are included as Addendum A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The prior appeal was decided on February 2, 1990, and is 
reported at 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 787 P.2d 508. A copy of that 
opinion is attached as Addendum B. References to the language of 
the opinion are located by citing the reporters. 
For the sake of clarity and continuity, the Appellant is 
referred to hereinafter as "Wright" and the Appell€*es, as 
"Humphries." 
On the prior appeal, the principal issues Wright raised 
related to fraudulent misrepresentation, repayment of funds which 
Humphries had deposited into the Westside Nursery account and the 
exoneration of a preliminary injunction bond. 
On cross-appeal, Humphries sought the entry of a judgment 
for wrongful termination of his employment contract, additional 
interest and attorney fees on his "indemnification" claim, and 
prejudgment interest on the fraud claim. 
Wright prevailed on every issue presented on the appeal 
with the exception of the issue relating to the repayment of funds 
deposited into the nursery account. Humphries was denied any 
relief on his cross-appeal. 
This Court ultimately reduced Humphries' net judgment 
(excluding attorney fees) from $58,780.21 to $20,180.00. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded: "[S]ome adjustment may be 
necessary so that [Humphries] does not recover [attorney] fees 
attributable to issues on which he did not prevail." 127 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 27, 787 P.2d at 517. 
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Finally, this Court concluded that Wright was "properly 
regarded as the party who prevailed on appeal and 'is entitled on 
remand to an award of [his] attorney fees reasonably incurred on 
appeal.'" 127 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27, 787 P.2d at 517. 
The remittitur was docketed in the district court on 
March 6, 1990 (R 1). On March 7, Wright filed his bill of costs 
and mailed a photocopy thereof to Humphries' attorney on the same 
day (R 14-15). 
Wright simultaneously filed a motion to reduce the 
attorney fees awarded Humphries at trial and to assess against 
Humphries the attorney fees which Wright reasonably incurred on 
appeal (R 12-13, 16-17). That motion was heard on March 21, 1990 
(R 18-19). At the hearing, Humphries verbally, and for the first 
time, voiced an objection to the bill of costs. 
As the hearing proceeded, Wright's counsel testified that 
fully 90% of his fee was attributable to the defense of the fraud 
claim which Humphries had asserted against Wright (T 6). On the 
other hand, Humphries' counsel stated that only approximately 20% 
of his time was related to the fraud issue (T 19). He expressed no 
opinion regarding the amount of time expended in connection with 
the wrongful termination claim which failed in post-trial 
proceedings and ultimately on Humphries' cross-appeal (T 19-20). 
Wright's counsel, in testimony, suggested an adjustment 
based upon the 66% reduction on the judgment mandated by the Court 
of Appeals as a reasonable basis for reducing the attorney fees 
awarded Humphries at trial (T 7). 
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Humphries' counsel suggested that inasmuch as the jury 
had not awarded him all of the attorney fees he had sought, the 
jury had already made an appropriate adjustment in Humphries' 
attorney fees (T 16). 
Because it was impossible to divine the basis of the jury 
award of attorney fees and determine how much of the award was 
attributable to issues upon which Humphries did not ultimately 
prevail, the district court refused to make any adjustment of the 
award (T 24-26; R 20-23; See Addendum D). 
Finally, the district court ordered Wright's bill of 
costs stricken (R 21) because the opinion of "the Court of Appeals 
doesn't mention costs" (T 24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wright was specifically identified as "the party who 
prevailed on appeal" and is under prevailing rules and precedents, 
entitled to the costs he incurred on the prior appeal. 
The district court was presented ample evidence upon 
which it could have made a reasonable reduction of the attorney 
fees awarded Humphries at trial. In light of the substantial 
modification of the judgment on appeal, the district court €>rred in 
refusing to make any modification of Humphries' attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WRIGHT WAS ENTITLED TO AND AWARDED COSTS ON THE 
PRIOR APPEAL. 
On the prior appeal this Court concluded that Wright was 
5 
"properly regarded as the party who prevailed on appeal and 'is 
entitled on remand to an award of [his] attorney fees reasonably 
incurred on appeal.'" 
Rule 34, R.Utah Ct.App., effective at the time of the 
decision on the prior appeal, provided in relevant part: 
(a) To whom awarded. Except as otherwise provided 
by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be 
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a 
judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed 
against the appellant unless otherwise ordered; if 
a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be 
taxed against the respondent unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or 
reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be 
allowed as ordered by the court. 
Paragraph (c) then enumerates the items taxable as costs 
"in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal" and paragraph (d) 
mentions "the cost bill of the prevailing party." 
When the new rules of appellate practice were proposed in 
1984, the language of proposed Rule 34 was substantially the same 
as that quoted above. The Advisory Committee Note1 regarding 
Paragraph (a) stated: 
This Paragraph provides that the prevailing party 
shall generally be awarded costs, unless the 
Supreme Court orders otherwise. It is not 
anticipated that the written opinion of the Supreme 
Court will, after adoption of this rule, 
specifically award costs unless there is a 
departure from the general rule. 
In delivering its opinion this Court took time to analyze 
the numerous issues presented on appeal and cross-appeal concluded 
Attached Addendum A is a reproduction of Rule 34 as proposed in 1984, 
together with the Advisory Committee Note. When the Court of Appeals was later 
created, Rule 34 was adopted as a rule of this Court with only minor changes. 
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that Wright was "the party who prevai led on appeal" and ordered the 
d i s t r i c t court to award him attorney fees reasonably incurred on 
the appeal . 
The des ignat ion of Wright as "the party who preva i l ed on 
appeal" and the award of at torney fees are incongruous with the 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s conclus ion that Wright i s not e n t i t l e d t o the 
c o s t s incurred on the appeal . 2 
In Everts v . Worrell , 58 Utah 238, 197 P. 1043 (1921) , 
Everts won the reversa l of a judgment in favor of Worrell . The 
Utah Supreme Court's opinion concluded with the fo l lowing: 
Judgment i s therefore reversed, and the causes 
remanded to the d i s t r i c t court of Weber county, 
with d i r e c t i o n s t o grant P l a i n t i f f a new t r i a l a t 
defendant's c o s t . 
On remand the d i s t r i c t court refused t o a l low Everts t o 
enforce a judgment for c o s t s against Worrell , i n t e r p r e t i n g the 
language of the Supreme Court opinion to apply only t o c o s t s 
inc ident t o the new t r i a l and not to c o s t s on appeal . On Everts ' 
a p p l i c a t i o n for wr i t of mandate, Everts v . Barker . 58 Utah 519, 200 
2In r e c i t i n g the b a s i s of i t s dec i s i on , the d i s t r i c t court s ta ted: 
[BY THE COURT] In reviewing the opinion in t h i s case , the 
Court of Appeals doesn't mention c o s t s • I don't know i f 
t h a t ' s because no appl icat ion was made for c o s t s before the 
Court of Appeals, or because the i s sue jus t wasn't considered. 
But whatever the reason, the Court of Appeals, in f a c t , did 
not award Mr. Wright h i s c o s t s . 
Going s t r i c t l y by the language of Rule 34, I have t o conclude, 
there fore , that t h i s Court i s without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make any 
determination on the a p p l i c a b i l i t y or the award of c o s t s as 
requested by Mr. Wright. That's an i s sue that should have 
been ra i sed and decided upon before the Court of Appeals. 
Therefore, the request for an award of c o s t s i s denied. 
T . 2 4 . 
7 
P. 473 (1921), the Supreme Court held that the language of an 
appellate opinion must be construed in light of the circumstances 
of the case and prevailing rules of practice and precedents. An 
opinion must not be construed so as to result in an absurdity. The 
writ was issued.3 
Wright incurred an expense of nearly $3,000 in merely 
having a transcript of the trial proceedings prepared for review on 
appeal. A construction of the appellate opinion denying Wright 
costs will effectively impose upon him all of the costs associated 
with marshalling the evidence on an appeal in which he prevailed. 
The order of the district court must be reversed and 
Wright's bill of costs reinstated and enforced as a judgment. 
POINT II 
HUMPHRIES HAS WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO WRIGHT'S BILL 
OF COSTS BY HIS FAILURE TO OBJECT THERETO. 
Under Rule 3 4 ( d ) , R.Utah C t . A p p . , any o b j e c t i o n t o a b i l l 
of c o s t s had t o be f i l e d w i t h i n f i v e days of t h e s e r v i c e of t h e 
b i l l , t o g e t h e r w i t h a mot ion t o have t h e c o s t s t a x e d by t h e c o u r t . 
"If t h e r e i s no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e b i l l of c o s t s w i t h i n t h e a l l o t t e d 
t i m e , t h e c l e r k of t h a t c o u r t s h a l l t a x t h e c o s t s as f i l e d and 
e n t e r judgment f o r t h e p a r t y e n t i t l e d t h e r e t o * * * I f t h e c o s t 
b i l l o f t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i s t i m e l y opposed , t h e c l e r k , upon 
Uncertain about the appropriate means of procuring enforcement of t h i s 
Court's prior dec i s ion and review of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s orders on remand, 
Wright w i l l simultaneously p e t i t i o n t h i s Court for writ in the form of mandate. 
In some j u r i s d i c t i o n s c o s t s are taxed by the c lerk of the appe l la te court and any 
object ion t o the Clerk's determination i s considered d i r e c t l y by the appel late 
court . See Family Medical Bldq. v. S ta te , D.S.H.S. , 38 Wash.App. 738, 689 P.2d 
413 (1984). 
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reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a 
final determination and judgment ..." Any determination made by 
the clerk was reviewable by the court upon a request by either 
party made within five days of the entry of the judgment. 
The district court clerk has in fact entered Wright's 
cost bill on the judgment docket pursuant to Rule 34(d), R. Utah 
Ct. App.4 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REDUCE THE 
ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED HUMPHRIES AT TRIAL. 
This Court was fully aware of the fact that the issue of 
attorney fees had been submitted to the jury. The opinion clearly 
reflects an awareness of the fact that the district court had not 
made the initial determination5. Nevertheless, the district court 
was instructed to reexamine the issue of attorney fees in light of 
the decision on appeal. 
The Court of Appeals did not instruct, encourage, or 
expect the district court to divine the basis of the jury's 
findings. The task presented to the district court on remand had 
Note the docketing notation on the original bill of coats located at R. 
14-15 and reproduced here as Addendum C 
5Footnote 11 of the appellate opinion reads: 
The jury instruction regarding attorney fees was broder than 
the provisions in the Purchase Agreement which only provided 
for recovery of fees to the prevailing party who was 
"enforcing performance of any covenant or representation 
hereunder or for damage for breach thereof." The instruction 
given allowed the jury to award fees to the party who 
prevailed in the action. Neither party object€»d to this 
instruction and both thereby acquiesced in the instruction as 
given. Nor did either party object to having the jury make 
the attorney fee decision, a matter ordinarily better 
entrusted to the court. 
9 
nothing to do with the reconstruction of the jury's decision-making 
process. The jury concluded that $10,000 was a reasonable fee to 
be awarded Humphries in connection with the prosecution of all the 
claims presented. Such was the scope of the instructions given the 
jury. In terms of dollars and cents, only approximately one-third 
of Humphries' claim survived the appeal. 
The district court was presented ample evidence upon 
which a reasonable reduction of Humphries' attorney fees could and 
should have been made. In light of the substantial modification of 
the judgment on appeal, the district court erred in refusing to 
make any modification. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that 
the order of the district court striking Wright's cost bill must be 
reversed and said bill reinstated as a judgment. Furthermore, the 
district court's order refusing to modify the attorney fees awarded 
at trial should be reversed and this Court should specify the 
extent of any such reduction. 
DATED this day of June, 1990. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Appellant 
10 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this day of June, 1990, 
I did personally mail four true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing Brief to Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Defendant at 
250 South Main, P. 0. Box 726, Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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the judgment to the extent that the district court had required 
Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant Humphries certain funds deposited 
directly into the Westside Nursery account, affirmed the judgment 
to the extent that the Court had denied Humphries damages for 
wrongful termination, reversed the judgment to the extent that the 
district court had refused to exonerate the preliminary injunction 
bond and remanded the case for the purpose of assessing Plaintiff's 
attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal and considering a 
reduction of the attorney fees awarded Defendants at trial. 
On remand, the district court assessed attorney fees 
against Defendants but refused to reduce the attorney fees awarded 
Defendants at trial and ordered Plaintiff's bill of costs on appeal 
stricken. From that order, Plaintiff prosecutes this second 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in interpreting this 
Court's opinion as denying Plaintiff's costs on appeal and in 
ordering Plaintiff's bill of costs stricken? 
2. Did the district court err in refusing to modify the 
attorney fees awarded Humphries at trial? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all relevant authorities is quoted in the 
body of this brief. Additionally, the text of proposed Rule 34, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, together with the advisory 
committee's note are included as Addendum A. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The prior appeal was decided on February 2, 1990, and is 
reported at 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 787 P.2d 508. A copy of that 
opinion is attached as Addendum B. References to the language of 
the opinion are located by citing the reporters. 
For the sake of clarity and continuity, the Appellant is 
referred to hereinafter as "Wright" and the Appellees, as 
"Humphries." 
On the prior appeal, the principal issues Wright raised 
related to fraudulent misrepresentation, repayment of funds which 
Humphries had deposited into the Westside Nursery account and the 
exoneration of a preliminary injunction bond. 
On cross-appeal, Humphries sought the entry of a judgment 
for wrongful termination of his employment contract, additional 
interest and attorney fees on his "indemnification" claim, and 
prejudgment interest on the fraud claim. 
Wright prevailed on every issue presented on the appeal 
with the exception of the issue relating to the repayment of funds 
deposited into the nursery account. Humphries was denied any 
relief on his cross-appeal. 
This Court ultimately reduced Humphries' net judgment 
(excluding attorney fees) from $58,780.21 to $20,180.00. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded: "[S]ome adjustment may be 
necessary so that [Humphries] does not recover [ctttorney] fees 
attributable to issues on which he did not prevail." 127 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 27, 787 P.2d at 517. 
3 
Finally, this Court concluded that Wright was "properly 
regarded as the party who prevailed on appeal and 'is entitled on 
remand to an award of [his] attorney fees reasonably incurred on 
appeal.'" 127 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27, 787 P.2d at 517. 
The remittitur was docketed in the district court on 
March 6, 1990 (R 1). On March 7, Wright filed his bill of costs 
and mailed a photocopy thereof to Humphries' attorney on the same 
day (R 14-15). 
Wright simultaneously filed a motion to reduce the 
attorney fees awarded Humphries at trial and to assess against 
Humphries the attorney fees which Wright reasonably incurred on 
appeal (R 12-13, 16-17). That motion was heard on March 21, 1990 
(R 18-19). At the hearing, Humphries verbally, and for the first 
time, voiced an objection to the bill of costs. 
As the hearing proceeded, Wright's counsel testified that 
fully 90% of his fee was attributable to the defense of the fraud 
claim which Humphries had asserted against Wright (T 6). On the 
other hand, Humphries' counsel stated that only approximately 20% 
of his time was related to the fraud issue (T 19). He expressed no 
opinion regarding the amount of time expended in connection with 
the wrongful termination claim which failed in post-trial 
proceedings and ultimately on Humphries' cross-appeal (T 19-20). 
Wright's counsel, in testimony, suggested an adjustment 
based upon the 66% reduction on the judgment mandated by the Court 
of Appeals as a reasonable basis for reducing the attorney fees 
awarded Humphries at trial (T 7). 
4 
Humphries' counsel suggested that inasmuch as the jury 
had not awarded him all of the attorney fees he had sought, the 
jury had already made an appropriate adjustment in Humphries' 
attorney fees (T 16). 
Because it was impossible to divine the basis of the jury 
award of attorney fees and determine how much of the award was 
attributable to issues upon which Humphries did not ultimately 
prevail, the district court refused to make any adjustment of the 
award (T 24-26; R 20-23; See Addendum D). 
Finally, the district court ordered Wright's bill of 
costs stricken (R 21) because the opinion of "the Court of Appeals 
doesn't mention costs" (T 24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wright was specifically identified as "the party who 
prevailed on appeal" and is under prevailing rules and precedents, 
entitled to the costs he incurred on the prior appeal. 
The district court was presented ample evidence upon 
which it could have made a reasonable reduction of the attorney 
fees awarded Humphries at trial. In light of the substantial 
modification of the judgment on appeal, the district court esrred in 
refusing to make any modification of Humphries' attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WRIGHT WAS ENTITLED TO AND AWARDED COSTS ON THE 
PRIOR APPEAL. 
On the prior appeal this Court concluded that Wright was 
5 
"properly regarded as the party who prevailed on appeal and 'is 
entitled on remand to an award of [his] attorney fees reasonably 
incurred on appeal.'" 
Rule 34, R.Utah Ct.App.f effective at the time of the 
decision on the prior appeal, provided in relevant part: 
(a) To whom awarded. Except as otherwise provided 
by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be 
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a 
judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed 
against the appellant unless otherwise ordered; if 
a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be 
taxed against the respondent unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or 
reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be 
allowed as ordered by the court. 
Paragraph (c) then enumerates the items taxable as costs 
"in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal" and paragraph (d) 
mentions "the cost bill of the prevailing party." 
When the new rules of appellate practice were proposed in 
1984, the language of proposed Rule 34 was substantially the same 
as that quoted above. The Advisory Committee Note1 regarding 
Paragraph (a) stated: 
This Paragraph provides that the prevailing party 
shall generally be awarded costs, unless the 
Supreme Court orders otherwise. It is not 
anticipated that the written opinion of the Supreme 
Court will, after adoption of this rule, 
specifically award costs unless there is a 
departure from the general rule. 
In delivering its opinion this Court took time to analyze 
the numerous issues presented on appeal and cross-appeal concluded 
•^Attached Addendum A is a reproduction of Rule 34 as proposed in 1984, 
together with the Advisory Committee Note. When the Court of Appeals was later 
created, Rule 34 was adopted as a rule of this Court with only minor changes. 
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that Wright was "the party who prevailed on appeal" and ordered the 
district court to award him attorney fees reasonably incurred on 
the appeal. 
The designation of Wright as "the party who prevailed on 
appeal" and the award of attorney fees are incongruous with the 
district court's conclusion that Wright is not entitled to the 
costs incurred on the appeal.2 
In Everts v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238, 197 P. 1043 (1921), 
Everts won the reversal of a judgment in favor of Worrell. The 
Utah Supreme Court's opinion concluded with the following; 
Judgment is therefore reversed, and the causes 
remanded to the district court of Weber county, 
with directions to grant Plaintiff a new trial at 
defendant's cost. 
On remand the district court refused to allow Everts to 
enforce a judgment for costs against Worrell, interpreting the 
language of the Supreme Court opinion to apply only to costs 
incident to the new trial and not to costs on appeal. On Everts' 
application for writ of mandate, Everts v. Barker, 58 Utah 519, 200 
2In reciting the basis of its decision, the district court stated: 
[BY THE COURT] In reviewing the opinion in this case, the 
Court of Appeals doesn't mention costs. I don't know if 
that's because no application was made for costs before the 
Court of Appeals, or because the issue just wasn't considered. 
But whatever the reason, the Court of Appeals, in fact, did 
not award Mr. Wright his costs. 
Going strictly by the language of Rule 34, I have to conclude, 
therefore, that this Court is without jurisdiction to make any 
determination on the applicability or the award of costs as 
requested by Mr. Wright. That's an issue that should have 
been raised and decided upon before the Court of Appeals. 
Therefore, the request for an award of costs is denied. 
T. 24. 
7 
P. 473 (1921), the Supreme Court held that the language of an 
appellate opinion must be construed in light of the circumstances 
of the case and prevailing rules of practice and precedents. An 
opinion must not be construed so as to result in an absurdity. The 
writ was issued.3 
Wright incurred an expense of nearly $3,000 in merely 
having a transcript of the trial proceedings prepared for review on 
appeal. A construction of the appellate opinion denying Wright 
costs will effectively impose upon him all of the costs associated 
with marshalling the evidence on an appeal in which he prevailed. 
The order of the district court must be reversed and 
Wright's bill of costs reinstated and enforced as a judgment. 
POINT II 
HUMPHRIES HAS WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO WRIGHT'S BILL 
OF COSTS BY HIS FAILURE TO OBJECT THERETO. 
Under Rule 3 4 ( d ) , R.Utah C t . A p p . , any o b j e c t i o n t o a b i l l 
of c o s t s had t o be f i l e d w i t h i n f i v e days of t h e s e r v i c e of t h e 
b i l l , t o g e t h e r w i t h a mot ion t o have t h e c o s t s t a x e d by t h e c o u r t . 
"If t h e r e i s no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e b i l l of c o s t s w i t h i n t h e a l l o t t e d 
t i m e , t h e c l e r k of t h a t c o u r t s h a l l t a x t h e c o s t s as f i l e d and 
e n t e r judgment f o r t h e p a r t y e n t i t l e d t h e r e t o * * * I f t h e c o s t 
b i l l o f t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i s t i m e l y opposed , t h e c l e r k , upon 
Uncertain about the appropriate means of procuring enforcement of t h i s 
Court's prior dec i s ion and review of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s orders on remand, 
Wright w i l l simultaneously p e t i t i o n t h i s Court for writ in the form of mandate. 
In some j u r i s d i c t i o n s c o s t s are taxed by the c lerk of the appel la te court and any 
object ion t o the Clerk's determination i s considered d i r e c t l y by the appel late 
court . See Family Medical Bldq. v. S ta te , D.S.H.S. , 38 Wash.App. 738, 689 P.2d 
413 (1984). 
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reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a 
final determination and judgment ..." Any determination made by 
the clerk was reviewable by the court upon a request by either 
party made within five days of the entry of the judgment. 
The district court clerk has in fact entered Wright's 
cost bill on the judgment docket pursuant to Rule 34(d), R. Utah 
Ct. App.4 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REDUCE THE 
ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED HUMPHRIES AT TRIAL. 
This Court was fully aware of the fact that the issue of 
attorney fees had been submitted to the jury. The opinion clearly 
reflects an awareness of the fact that the district court had not 
made the initial determination5. Nevertheless, the district court 
was instructed to reexamine the issue of attorney fees in light of 
the decision on appeal. 
The Court of Appeals did not instruct, encourage, or 
expect the district court to divine the basis of the jury's 
findings. The task presented to the district court on remand had 
Note the docketing notation on the original bill of costs located at R. 
14-15 and reproduced here as Addendum C 
5Footnote 11 of the appellate opinion reads: 
The jury instruction regarding attorney fees was broder than 
the provisions in the Purchase Agreement which only provided 
for recovery of fees to the prevailing party who was 
"enforcing performance of any covenant or representation 
hereunder or for damage for breach thereof." The instruction 
given allowed the jury to award fees to the party who 
prevailed in the action. Neither party objected to this 
instruction and both thereby acquiesced in the instruction as 
given. Nor did either party object to having thcs jury make 
the attorney fee decision, a matter ordinarily better 
entrusted to the court. 
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nothing to do with the reconstruction of the jury's decision-making 
process• The jury concluded that $10,000 was a reasonable fee to 
be awarded Humphries in connection with the prosecution of all the 
claims presented. Such was the scope of the instructions given the 
jury. In terms of dollars and cents, only approximately one-third 
of Humphries' claim survived the appeal. 
The district court was presented ample evidence upon 
which a reasonable reduction of Humphries' attorney fees could and 
should have been made. In light of the substantial modification of 
the judgment on appeal, the district court erred in refusing to 
make any modification. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that 
the order of the district court striking Wright's cost bill must be 
reversed and said bill reinstated as a judgment. Furthermore, the 
district court's order refusing to modify the attorney fees awarded 
at trial should be reversed and this Court should specify the 
extent of any such reduction. 
DATED this (p day of JunQ,- 1990. 
/s/ 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Appellant 
10 
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foregoing Brief to Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Defendant at 
250 South Main, P. 0. Box 726, Cedar City, Utah 84720-
jii 
Gary W. Pendleton 
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Rule 34. AWARD OF COSTS. 
(a) To Whom Allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, 
if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appel-
lant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the 
Court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed 
against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order 
is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the respondent unless 
otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed 
in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the 
Court. Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and Against the State of Utah. In cases in-
volving the State of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an 
award of costs for or against the State shall be at the discre-
tion of the Court unless specifically required or prohibited by 
law. 
(c) Costs of Briefs and Attachments, Record, Bonds and Other 
Expenses on Appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor 
of the prevailing party in the appeal: The actual costs of a *^^ 
printed or typewritten brief and attachments not to exceed $3.00 , IK 
for each page; actual costs incurred in the preparation and trans-^T 
mission of the record including costs of the reporter's transcript^ 
unless otherwise ordered by the Court; premiums paid for super-
sedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the 
fees for filing and docketing the appeal. 
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(d) Bill of Costs Taxed After Remittitur. When costs are 
awarded to a party in an appeal from a lower court, a party 
claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is filed 
with the clerk of the court below, serve upon the adverse party 
'and file with the clerk of the court an itemized and verified 
bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days of service 
// of the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of objection 
)^ together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the court 
' !L0tX below. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the 
P. 
w" alloted time, the clerk of the court shall tax the costs as filed 
and enter judgment for the party entitled thereto, which judgment 
shall be entered in the judgment docket with the same force and 
effect as in the case of other judgments-of record. If the cost 
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon 
reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a 
final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered 
in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the 
case of other judgments of record. The determination of the 
clerk shall be reviewable by the district court upon the request 
of either party made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment. 
(e) Costs in Other Proceedings and Agency Appeals. 
In all other matters before the Court, including appeals from 
an agency, costs may be allowed as in cases on appeal from a lower 
court. Within 15 days after the expiration of the time in which 
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a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after 
an order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have 
been awarded may file with the Clerk of the Court and serve upon 
the adverse party an itemized and verified bill of costs. The 
adverse party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill 
of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to have the costs 
taxed by the Clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed 
within the alloted time, the Clerk shall thereupon tax the costs 
and enter judgment against the adverse party. If the adverse 
party timely objects to the cost bill, the Clerk, upon reasonable 
notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the costs, tax 
the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the 
adverse party. The determination by the Clerk shall be reviewable 
by the Court upon the request of either party made within 5 days 
of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument 
shall not be permitted. A judgment under this section may be 
filed with the clerk of any district court in the State who shall 
docket a ceritifed copy of the same in the manner and with the 
same force and effect as judgments of the district court. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This Rule is a substantial departure from current practice and 
rules. 
Paragraph (a). This Paragraph provides that the prevailing party 
shall generally be awarded costs, unless the Supreme Court orders other-
wise. It is not anticipated that written opinions of the Supreme Court 
will, after adoption of this Rule, specifically award costs unless 
there is a departure from the general rule. 
Ill 
Paragraph (b). Prior practice under Rule 54(d)(1) allowed costs 
against the State, its officers and agencies only to the extent allowed 
by law. Rule 33 modifies that concept to allow costs either for or 
against the State of Utah, its officers and/or agencies under the theory 
that if the State can recover costs, it should also be subject to costs 
at the discretion of the Court, unless specifically prohibited by law. 
Paragraph (c). The paragraph sets forth with particularity what 
costs are recoverable, and raises the allowable costs for each page 
of the original brief to 53.00 per page from $2,00 per page under prior 
Rule 75(p)(5) URCivP. The words "actual costs" in the paragraph ensure 
that parties only seek actual costs where the actual costs are less 
than $3.00 per page. 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph deals with costs on appeal from 
lower courts. The rule differs substantially from prior Rule 54(d)(3) 
URCivP in that costs are taxed, if an objection is timely made, by 
the district court clerk. It is not anticipated that the district 
court would be involved in taxing costs unless a party objects to the 
district court clerk's taxation of costs. The costs taxed by the dis-
trict court will automatically be docketed as a judgment without the 
necessity of a formal motion to enter a judgment for costs. The rule 
is self-enforcing, and a party desiring to recover costs must make 
a timely filing in the district court or costs are waived. 
ParaGraph (e). This paragraph deals with awarding costs in pro-
ceedings other than appeals from district courts, such as original 
proceedings and agency appeals. Costs and the taxing of costs are 
handled by the Clerk of the Supreme Court in the same manner as pre-
scribed for the clerk of the district court under paragraph (d) of 
this rule, including a review without oral argument by the Supreme 
Court if proper application is filed. A judgment for costs in the 
Supreme Court may be filed and docketed with any district court in 
the State of Utah with the same force and effect as a judgment entered 
by the district court. 
The provisions of Rule 54(d)(3) and (4) URCivP dealing with the 
assessment and taxing of costs en appeal and in original proceedings 
before the Supreme Court are repealed as of the effective date of these 
Rules. 
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Case No. 880544-CA 
Fifth District, Washington County 
The Honorable J. Philip Eves 
M*9h C#urt m 
Attorneys: Gary W. Pendleton, St. George, for Appellant 
Hans Q. Chamberlain, Cedar City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Plaintiff George Wright ("Wright") appeals from several 
adverse rulings made during the course of trial in this 
complicated case. Defendants Westside Nursery and Darrel 
Humphries ("Humphries") cross-appeal from two postjudgment 
rulings in the same case. We affirm in part, reverse in part, 
vacate in part, and remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
The numerous issues raised on appeal require, regrettably, a 
somewhat laborious presentation of the facts. Except where the 
discrepancies are identified, the facts as set forth are 
essentially undisputed. 
PRETRIAL FACTS 
Humphries was general partner and manager of Westside 
Nursery located in St. George, Utah. In 1985, Wright contracted 
with Westside Nursery to landscape his residence in St. George. 
During this time, Wright and Humphries began to discuss the 
possibility of Wright purchasing the nursery. At some point in 
the negotiations, the parties agreed Wright would exchange real 
estate for the nursery. 
In August 1985, Humphries flew to Ogden, Weber County, where 
Wright owned several acres of land, and stayed the night in 
Wright's home. There was conflicting evidence about whether the 
parties were contemplating the property exchange at this time and 
about whether Humphries viewed the property during this visit. 
In October 1985, Humphries and his wife traveled to the 
Ogden area. On October 4th, the parties spent several hours 
reviewing and revising two agreements which had been previously 
drafted by Wright's attorney. The first agreement, the Agreement 
for Purchase of Assets ("Purchase Agreement"), concerned the 
exchange of the property for the nursery. The second, the 
Contract for Management Services ("Management Agreement"), 
concerned Wright's employment of Humphries as nursery manager. 
The agreements were signed and deeds were executed conveying the 
Weber County property to Humphries. 
Although Humphries inspected the property on the same day 
that the contracts were executed, the parties disagree on whether 
he saw it before or after the execution. Humphries testified 
that he saw it only afterward. While showing Mr. and Mrs. 
Humphries the property, Wright identified several surrounding 
parcels of property and the range of prices for which they had 
been purchased. He also pointed out that there was no sewer 
currently servicing the area, but informed Humphries that he 
expected one to be installed within a year and a half. No 
evidence was admitted to suggest that any of this information was 
false. Moreover, the sewer was in fact installed within two 
years. 
Humphries' position throughout the trial was that Wright had 
represented the Weber County property as being worth at least 
$90,000. He alleged that Wright told him this on October 4th 
when they went to see the property. Wright consistently 
maintained that the property was indeed worth $90,000, but denied 
ever having made this representation prior to executing the 
contracts. 
nnn*kAA-rA n 
Wright admitted during the trial that he did not know the 
exact value of the property. There was no evidence to suggest 
that an appraisal had ever been made of the property prior to 
this litigation. However, Wright did testify about the selling 
price of similar properties in the surrounding area. Moreover, 
he introduced evidence that the property was valued at 
approximately $104,000 for tax purposes. The parties each 
introduced expert testimony concerning the value of the property 
as of when the transaction was finalized. The appraisals covered 
a wide range, from $35,000 to $84,000. Humphries testified that 
he sold the property for $54,700, to a neighboring landowner, a 
few days before trial. 
Meanwhile, on October 15, 1985, only a few days after the 
transaction closed, the Weber County Commission declared a 
limited moratorium on the area which contained the subject parcel 
of land. The moratorium prevented owners from building 
subdivisions on the affected land without approval from the 
commission. Evidence was introduced demonstrating that Wright 
knew of the potential for this moratorium before the October 4th 
closing but did not disclose the possibility to Humphries. 
However, Wright introduced unrebutted evidence he had spoken to 
several governmental officials about the potential moratorium and 
that they had led him to believe the moratorium would probably 
not be declared and that, if it were, his property would probably 
receive approval for development anyway. 
After execution of the contracts and before the end of 
November 1985, Humphries claims he heard rumors that the Weber 
County Property might not be worth $90,000. He then made some 
inquiries and determined that he had been defrauded. On December 
10, 1985, Humphries* attorney wrote a letter to Wright expressing 
his suspicions and proposing to settle the dispute. On December 
18, the attorney wrote a second letter informing Wright that 
Humphries considered the Purchase Agreement cancelled and 
rescinded. 
On December 23, Wright initiated an action to determine the 
ownership of the nursery. On the same day, the trial court 
issued a temporary restraining order which prohibited Humphries 
from doing anything with the nursery inconsistent with Wright's 
ownership and prevented him from incurring further debt on behalf 
of Wright or the nursery. 
From October 1985 through March 1986, Humphries managed the 
nursery pursuant to the Management Agreement and drew a salary of 
$2,500 per month. Prior to the sale of the nursery to Wright, 
Humphries had obtained a $15,000 loan from Zions Bank which he 
remained obligated to pay under the Purchase Agreement. 
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Subsequent to the sale, Humphries signed a second promissory note 
for $30,000 in favor of Zions Bank. He drew $15,000 against the 
note on December 13, 1985, prior to the December 23 restraining 
order. On December 30, he drew an additional $5,000 on the note, 
and the remaining $10,000 on January 6, 1986. The entire $30,000 
was, at least initially, deposited into the nursery account. 
In March 1986, Wright sought possession of the nursery. The 
trial court ordered Humphries to relinquish his possession of the 
nursery to Wright, imposed various duties on the parties, and 
appointed a receiver to assist the court in monitoring the 
business and the parties' compliance with its order. As a 
condition to issuance of this second temporary restraining 
order,1 the court ordered Wright to procure a $50,000 
injunction bond. Wright did so. He then discharged Humphries 
and took possession of the nursery. 
LITIGATION FACTS 
As indicated, Wright filed a complaint against Humphries in 
December 1985. In due course, Humphries answered the complaint 
and raised various counterclaims. On September 17, 1986, a 
hearing was held concerning several pending motions. Most 
significantly, the district court found that Humphries had waived 
his right to seek rescission of the contract and that adequate 
remedies existed at law. Therefore, the court dismissed 
Humphries' claim for rescission with prejudice. 
The balance of the dispute was tried to a jury in April 
1988, and trial took five days to complete. Wright attempted to 
establish that Humphries had breached the contracts by 
misappropriating nursery money for his own use and borrowing 
funds from Zions Bank without authorization and therefore should 
not be reimbursed for any of those monies. Humphries attempted 
to establish that Wright had induced him to enter into the 
contract by fraudulently misrepresenting the value of the 
property. He also introduced evidence to suggest that Wright had 
tortiously failed to disclose the potential moratorium, although 
the jury was never instructed regarding fraudulent omission. 
Both parties argued for attorney fees and Humphries introduced 
evidence that he had incurred over $30,000 in attorney fees and 
1. Although captioned as a temporary restraining order, the 
March order giving Wright possession of the nursery was 
procedurally, and in substance, a preliminary injunction. 
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costs. The case was submitted to the jury for special verdicts 
in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a) . 
The jury returned the following special verdicts: 
(1) Humphries breached the agreements between the parties and as 
a result should pay Wright $6,805; (2) Wright breached the 
agreements by terminating Humphries and should pay Humphries 
$15,000; (3) Wright breached the agreements in other respects but 
no damages resulted; (4) Wright should pay up to $5,000 in 
accounts payable existing prior to the transaction; (5) Humphries 
should pay such accounts beyond $5,000; (6) Humphries should 
receive the accounts receivable prior to October 4, 1985; 
(7) Humphries should pay the $15,000 loan acquired prior to 
October 4, 1985; (8) Wright should pay the $30,000 loan acquired 
after October 4, 1985, with interest; (9) Wright made fraudulent 
misrepresentations about the value of the property and should pay 
Humphries $38,582 in damages; (10) Wright should pay Humphries 
$10,000 in attorney fees. 
The foreman of the jury was questioned by the court 
concerning the $6,805 award for Humphries' breach of the 
contracts. The foreman explained that the amount represented 
various payments Humphries had made out of the nursery account 
which the jury found he misappropriated to his own use. 
After the trial, Wright moved for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict and for the court to exonerate the injunction bond. 
The court denied the motions. It did, however, deny the $15,000 
award to Humphries because the court found as a matter of law 
that Humphries had been properly terminated given the jury 
finding he misappropriated nursery funds. In its judgment on the 
verdict, the court affirmed all of its previous orders including 
the two restraining orders. In total, it awarded Humphries a 
judgment of $68,780.21, to bear interest at the legal rate until 
paid in full. 
Most of the net award to Humphries came directly from the 
special verdict. However, $20,198.21 of the award bears some 
additional explanation. The jury found that Wright was obligated 
to pay the $30,000 loan from Zions Bank plus interest which had 
accrued as of the date of trial. The interest amounted to 
approximately $7,000. From the $37,000 total, the court 
subtracted approximately $17,000. This amount represented the 
nursery account monies that Humphries had misappropriated to 
himself, as found by the jury, and additional sums paid for 
legitimate nursery expenses for which Humphries was liable under 




jury that Wright was actually liable for the $30,000 loan. 
Instead, the court held that Wright was obligated to reimburse 
Humphries for that portion of the $30,000 loan which made its way 
into the nursery account and was used to pay obligations for 
which Wright was ultimately responsible. 
On appeal, Wright makes the following arguments: 
(1) Humphries failed to prove a prima facie case of fraudulent 
misrepresentation; (2) the jury determination of the value of th 
real property at the time of the transaction was unsupported by 
the evidence; (3) the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate 
that Wright should indemnify Humphries for the $30,000 loan fr 
Zions Bank; (4) Humphries was not entitled to attorney fees; and 
(5) the district court erred in failing to exonerate the 
injunction bond. Humphries cross-appeals and makes the following 
arguments: (1) The district court erred in dismissing the 
$15,000 jury award for Humphries' wrongful termination; (2) the 
district court erred in failing to award prejudgment interest  
the $38,582 fraud award; and (3) this court should direct the 
trial court to amend its judgment to include postjudgment 
interest, costs, and attorney fees on the part of the judgment 
premised on Wright's obligation to pay most of the amount 
attributable to the $30,000 note. We will discuss each of these 
claims. 
FRAUD 
Wright argues on appeal that the jury did not have 
sufficient evidence upon which to base its verdict of fraud. We 
of course consider the evidence in a light favorable to the 
verdict and "we will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
jury where the verdict is supported by substantial and competent 
evidence." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
Moreover, Wright's duty on appeal is to "marshal all the evidence 
supporting the verdict and demonstrate that, even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient to support it." £&. (citing Scharf v. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). With this standard 
of review in mind, we note that Wright's marshaling of the 
evidence is adequate to permit our consideration of this 
issue.2 
2. Wright beseeches us to make a thorough review of the whole 
record, which fills a box the size of an orange crate. We do not 
apologize for declining Wright's invitation. The very purpose of 
At trial, Humphries had the burden to prove all the 
essential elements of the fraud claim. Pace v. Parish, 122 
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 274 (1952). Although both parties 
address two fraud theories on appeal—fraudulent 
misrepresentation concerning the value of the property and 
fraudulent concealment of the building moratorium—the jury was 
only instructed regarding the first theory* We cannot affirm 
the verdict based upon a theory which was not presented to the 
jury for consideration. Consequently, Humphries may only 
prevail if he sustained his burden of proving each element of 
the fraudulent misrepresentation claim. He failed to meet this 
burden. 
The elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim are: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, 
or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he 
had insufficient knowledge upon which to 
base such representation; (5) for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) 
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his 
injury and damage. 
Pace, 247 P.2d at 274-75. Distilling the argument somewhat, 
Wright basically argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support elements 2 (material fact) and 4 (mental state). 
Because the representation of value, if made, was a matter of 
opinion and not of fact, we need not address the sufficiency of 
the evidence regarding Wright's state of mind. 
(footnote 2 continued) 
such devices as the "marshaling" doctrine and R. Utah Ct. App. 
24(a)(7), requiring that all references in briefs to factual 
matters "be supported by citations to the record," is to spare 
appellate courts such an onerous burden. Absent exceptional 
circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those 
specific portions of the record which have been drawn to our 
attention by the parties and which are relevant to the legal 
questions properly before us. 
Humphries alleged at trial that Wright had falsely 
represented the value of the Weber County property. However, 
"misrepresentations as to value do not ordinarily constitute 
fraud, as they are regarded as mere expressions of opinion or 
•trader's talk1 involving matter of judgment and estimation as 
to which men may differ," Baird v. Eflow Inv. Co., 7 6 Utah 232, 
289 P. 112, 114 (1930). &e£ also Frazier v. Southwest Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 134 Ariz. 12, 653 P.2d 362, 365 (Ct. App. 1982) 
("Mere representations as to value are generally considered 
expressions of opinion and will not support a claim for 
fraud."); Poison Co. v. Imperial Cattle Co., 624 P.2d 993, 996 
(Mont. 1981) ("Statements as to the value of property are 
generally considered declarations of opinion. . . . " ) ; Davis v. 
Schiess, 417 P.2d 19, 21 (Wyo. 1966) ("[A]n expression of 
opinion as to value is not fraud."). Indeed, the jury was 
instructed to this effect.3 
Although usually opinion, expressions of value have 
occasionally been regarded as fraudulent misrepresentations of 
fact. Mostly, parties have prevailed when they have offered 
"substantial evidence to show bad faith or to show the 
expression of value was not [the owner's] real opinion." Davis. 
417 P.2d at 21. See also Baird, 289 P. at 114 (listing examples 
of the kinds of bad faith indicia which demonstrate that the 
representation is not a bona fide opinion).4 In this case, 
however, the record is devoid of any evidence of this kind. 
In his brief, Humphries points to three facts which he 
believes demonstrate that the representation of value was made 
3. Jury Instruction No. 26 included this statement: "The value 
of property is subjective. It is a matter of opinion." 
4. When an owner's opinion of value is the basis of the 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim, courts are primarily 
concerned with whether or not the stated value was in fact the 
owner's actual opinion. In a sense, these cases do not really 
represent exceptions to the usual rule that the operative 
misrepresentation be of a presently existing fact. Rather, the 
owner implicitly represents a fact when he gives his opinion, 
namely that he presently holds the opinion he is giving. If the 
stated value is truly the owner's opinion then the buyer may not 
base his or her fraud claim on that opinion, regardless of the 
accuracy of the opinion. On the other hand, if the evidence 
suggests that the stated value was not the owner's true opinion, 
this fact may be the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation 
claim. 
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in bad faith and was not Wright's honest opinion: (1) Wright 
did not know the actual value of the property when he made the 
statement because the property had not been appraised; (2) 
Wright referred to the selling price of other properties in the 
development when he allegedly gave Humphries his estimate; (3) 
Wright failed to disclose the potential building moratorium. We 
will discuss each of these facts. 
The fact that the property had not been appraised before 
Wright made his representation does not support Humphries' 
argument. The law does not require a landowner to obtain an 
appraisal before he or she can state an opinion about the value 
of his or her land.5 
Humphries may not prevail under his second argument, i.e., 
that Wright made reference to the price of other similar 
properties. Initially, it is difficult to see how Humphries can 
seriously make this argument. His own position at trial was 
that he signed the contract before Wright took him to view the 
property and made reference to the surrounding properties. How, 
then, could these statements about the value of adjacent 
property have been relied on by Humphries in deciding bo enter 
into the contract? Moreover, Humphries introduced no evidence 
to suggest that any of the statements concerning the surrounding 
properties were false in any way. There was simply no evidence 
of bad faith concerning statements about the surrounding 
properties from which the jury could have inferred that Wright's 
representation was other than honest opinion. 
Thirdly, Humphries argues that the failure to disclose the 
potential moratorium evidenced bad faith and the disingenuousness 
of Wright's opinion. The only fact to support this argument is 
that Wright knew of the potential moratorium before the 
transaction. However, the moratorium was placed on the property 
after the transaction was formalized and Wright consistently 
testified that public officials had encouraged his belief that 
the moratorium, if imposed, would not be a problem—a conclusion 
borne out by subsequent events. Although the depositions of 
5. If an owner is competent to give evidence on the market 
value of his property, as the jury was correctly instructed in 
Jury Instruction No. 27, it is logical to assume that he may 
competently give an opinion of the value v/ithout first obtaining 
an appraisal. Otherwise, he would merely be passing along the 
appraiser's opinion. 
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these public officials had been taken prior to trial, Humphries 
introduced no evidence to rebut Wright's testimony. Thus, there 
was no substantial, competent evidence from which the jury could 
have found Wright falsely stated his opinion as to the value of 
the property because of what he knew about the potential 
moratorium.° 
In contrast to Humphries1 lack of evidence regarding bad 
faith, Wright introduced evidence to show his good faith, 
including the property tax assessment of $104,688 and his 
unrebutted testimony that he knew of similar properties in the 
area which had sold for comparable prices. 
We conclude our discussion of the fraud issue with the 
observation that while the 
law provides reasonable protection to 
purchasers against fraud and deceit[,] . . . 
it does not go to the romantic length of 
offering indemnity against the adverse 
consequences of folly and indolence or a 
careless indifference to information which 
would enlighten the purchaser as to the 
truth or falsity of the seller's assertions 
as to value. 
Poison, 624 P.2d at 996. The record does not disclose any 
reason, other than his own blind reliance upon Wright's 
representations, why Humphries chose to formalize the 
transaction prior—at least as he recalled—to even viewing the 
property, much less making independent inquiry or obtaining his 
own appraisal. "It is reasonable to expect that . . . vendors 
would attach the highest possible value to the property. 
Indeed, it would be unreasonable to assume otherwise, and 
purchasers who rely on such representations proceed at their own 
risk." M . at 997. See also Pace, 247 P.2d at 275 
("[P]laintiffs did not use reasonable care and diligence [and] 
6. As noted previously in this opinion, Humphries failed to 
have the jury instructed on a fraudulent omission claim. Had 
the jury been instructed under this alternative theory, we would 
be more inclined to affirm the verdict based upon Wright's 
failure to inform Humphries of the potential moratorium. 
However, in the context of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim 
premised on a statement of value, the mere omission of the 
moratorium information bears little weight given the record 
before us. 
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were, therefore, not entitled to rely on the representation 
. . . . ••); Baird, 289 P. at 114 ("There was nothing done by the 
defendants to prevent the plaintiff from making the fullest 
inquiry and investigation concerning the value of the 
apartments.") . 
In the absence of substantial and competent evidence of 
bad faith on Wright's part, we must reverse the fraud 
verdict.7 
"INDEMNIFICATION" 
Wright argues that there was insufficient evidence for the 
jury verdict requiring him to "indemnify" Humphries for the 
$30,000 loan from Zions Bank. As noted in the Eoregoing 
section, when an appellant challenges the sufficiency of 
evidence, his duty on appeal is to "marshal all the evidence 
supporting the verdict and demonstrate that, even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the 
evidence is insufficient to support it." Van Hake v. Thomas, 
705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985) (citing Scharf, 700 P.2d at 1070). 
Unlike his marshaling with respect to the fraud verdict, 
Wright's marshaling of the evidence for this argument was 
inadequate. He completely failed to identify and explain any 
of the evidence supporting the jury verdict. See also note 2, 
supra. On the other hand, Humphries refers us to numerous 
facts from the record upon which the jury could have based its 
verdict. We will not disturb the jury verdict where, as here, 
appellant has completely failed to sustain his burden of 
marshaling the evidence. 
In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence, Wright argues that the jury was improperly instructed 
regarding Humphries' burden to establish his right to 
reimbursement of monies he expended in connection with the 
nursery business. We have considered this argument and find it 
to be without merit. The jury heard conflicting evidence about 
whether Wright instructed or encouraged further indebtedness 
and about the use of loan proceeds after they were placed in 
the nursery account. We believe the jury could reasonably 
conclude from the instructions given and evidence adduced that 
7. Because we reverse the fraud verdict, we need not discuss 
Wright's arguments that the jury improperly determined the 
award for that claim or Humphries' claim that he was entitled 
to prejudgment interest on the fraud award. 
Humphries was entitled to reimbursement of the basic amounts 
found due by the jury. Thus, we affirm as to the 
"indemnification" issue. 
POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST, COSTS AND FEES ON $30,000 AWARD 
Humphries argues that Wright should be obligated to pay 
all amounts which are incurred postjudgment in connection with 
the $30,000 promissory note, including interest as set forth in 
the note and any costs and attorney fees which he may incur as 
a result of collection action taken on the note. We disagree. 
The applicable special verdict regarding the $30,000 loan 
from Zions Bank might have been more artfully phrased. 
However, the court clearly and correctly concluded from the 
jury's findings that Wright was obligated to pay that portion 
of the borrowed $30,000 which was deposited into the nursery 
account and legitimately used for nursery purposes for which 
Wright, rather than Humphries, was properly chargeable. Thus, 
in calculating a lump sum which Wright should pay to Humphries, 
the court began with the $30,000 plus interest accrued as of 
the date of trial. From this amount, the court subtracted 
various sums which Humphries was obligated to pay either 
because he had misappropriated funds or because he was properly 
chargeable for them under the parties' arrangement. 
Although the parties have argued in terms of 
"indemnification" regarding the $30,000 loan, this terminology 
is not altogether appropriate. The court did not anticipate an 
ongoing relationship between the parties, or responsibility on 
the part of Wright, as would have occurred with indemnification 
in the technical sense.8 Rather, the court anticipated and 
implemented a clean break of the relationship through a lump 
sum payment. 
8. Had the court meant Wright to indemnify Humphries it would 
have awarded only that amount which Humphries had paid on the 
note as of the date of the judgment, perhaps accompanied with 
declaratory relief to the effect that Wright should continue to 
indemnify Humphries for any payments subsequently made. Under 
this scenario, the payment of postjudgment interest at the 
contract rate, as well as incurred attorney fees and costs, 
would make sense, albeit on a prospective basis only. 
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In effect, the court viewed the $30,000 as Humphries' 
money which had been used in part for the operation of Wright's 
nursery. The court did not require Wright to directly pay off 
the note. Moreover, it only required Wright to pay to 
Humphries that portion of the $30,000 which Humphries had used 
for the nursery and for which Wright was responsible. Thus, we 
believe the court correctly viewed payment of the note, per se, 
as Humphries' obligation.9 The operative theory, then, was 
more one of equitable reimbursement or accounting rather than 
indemnification. Accordingly, Humphries was not: entitled to 
postjudgment interest at higher than the legal rate, or costs 
or attorney fees for which Humphries might eventually become 
responsible if he chose to forego prompt repayment of the note 
and his bank brought collection action. 
EXONERATION OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BOND 
In March 1986, the trial court gave possession of the 
nursery to Wright under an order captioned as a temporary 
restraining order. But see note 1, supra. Wright was required 
to post a preliminary injunction bond to compensate Humphries 
in the event that the order was wrongfully entered. See Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65A(c). Wright discharged Humphries, took 
possession of the nursery, and retained control of the nursery 
thereafter. The injunction and bond remained in effect until 
the trial, following which the order was specifically affirmed 
in the court's final judgment. After the trial on the merits, 
Wright moved to exonerate the injunction bond. The court 
denied Wright's motion, for reasons which do not appear in the 
record before us. We hold that it was error for the court not 
to exonerate the bond. 
According to Rule 65A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the purpose of an injunction bond is to provide "for 
the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or 
suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully 
9. This view is bolstered by a discussion between counsel and 
the court which took place at a post-trial hearing on July 12, 
1988. In that hearing the court emphasized the fact that there 
was no evidence Wright had participated in the loan 
negotiations or authorized Humphries to accept the bank's 
terms. Thus, although Wright was obligated to reimburse most 
of the amounts used for nursery purposes, Humphries was 
exclusively obligated on the note. 
enjoined or restrained." Id. (emphasis added). A right of 
action on the bond does not arise until the court dissolves the 
injunction or determines that the injunction should not have 
been granted. 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 380 (1969). Moreover, 
if it is finally determined that the injunction was proper, the 
purpose for the bond has been achieved and it may be 
exonerated. See id. 
In a pretrial motion for summary judgment, Wright argued 
that Humphries had waived his right to rescind the Purchase 
Agreement. The court agreed and dismissed with prejudice 
Humphries' claim for rescission and consequently his claim for 
possession of the nursery, Humphries was apparently resigned to 
that decision—he never sought its reconsideration, did not 
contest it at trial, and has not appealed it—but rather pursued 
his remedies at law. Moreover, he has never challenged the 
validity of the injunction. After the trial on the merits, the 
court affirmed its prior orders including the injunction. Once 
final judgment was entered, the preliminary injunction 
necessarily terminated. The injunction having terminated, the 
court was bound to exonerate the bond upon proper motion and it 
erred when it refused to do so. 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION 
In its special verdict, the jury concluded that Wright 
terminated Humphries as an employee contrary to the terms of the 
Management Agreement. It awarded Humphries $15,000. The court, 
however, determined that Wright was justified in terminating 
Humphries as a matter of law and dismissed the wrongful 
termination claim. Humphries argues that the court abused its 
discretion in dismissing this claim. We do not agree. 
Following the trial and jury deliberations, the foreman 
read the special verdicts. The trial judge, presumably to 
clarify apparent conflict among the various awards, then 
questioned him concerning certain of the damage awards. In 
particular, the foreman was asked to explain the $6,805 awarded 
to Wright for Humphries' breach of the agreements. His response 
clearly indicated that the jury found Humphries had, on several 
occasions prior to his termination, misappropriated funds from 
the nursery for his own use and the award reflected those 
misappropriations. 
It is a basic tenet of agency law that "[a] principal is 
privileged to discharge before the time fixed by the contract of 
employment an agent who has committed such a violation of duty 
that his conduct constitutes a material breach of contract." 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 409(1) (1958)- Humphries can 
hardly argue that misappropriation of thousands of dolLars in 
nursery funds was anything but a material breach of the 
Management Agreement. 
The jury foreman's more detailed responses to the effect 
that Humphries had misappropriated funds were inconsistent with 
the general conclusion that Wright had breached the agreements 
by terminating Humphries as an employee. Courts need to 
reconcile these kinds of inconsistencies. Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). However, 
where the two cannot be reconciled, as in this case, the more 
specific finding must govern the outcome. £Lf . Knape v. 
Livingston Oil Co., 193 Kan. 278, 392 P.2d 842, 844 (1964) ("If 
special findings cannot be reconciled with the general verdict 
and are sufficiently full and complete in themselves, and are 
not inconsistent in themselves, judgment must follow the special 
findings."); Johnson v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 
53, 600 P.2d 583, 585 (1979) ("A special finding inconsistent 
with the general verdict controls."). Thus, we hold that the 
court appropriately dismissed the wrongful termination claim 
since Wright had good cause, as a matter of law, to terminate 
Humphries.10 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Wright challenges the award of attorney fees to Humphries 
as not being rationally based. The jury was instructed that 
"the prevailing party in this action is entitled to a reasonable 
10. Humphries cites us to Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. 
Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that "[w]hen 
special interrogatories or verdicts are ambiguous, counsel has 
an obligation either to object to the filing of the verdict or 
to move that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for 
clarification." Id. at 1083. As counsel recognized, the 
purpose of this rule is to avoid "the expense and additional 
time for a new trial by having the jury which heard the facts 
clarify the ambiguity while it is able to do so." Id,. In this 
case, the trial court obviated the need for this formality by 
recognizing the inconsistency and seeking immediate 
clarification from the jury. 
attorney's fee incurred in connection herewith." Based upon 
this instruction, the jury awarded Humphries $10,000 in attorney 
fees.11 Although we have significantly modified the judgment 
on appeal, Humphries still appears to be properly regarded as 
the party who prevailed at trial. See generally Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-57 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). However, he did not hold on to all of his trial victory 
on appeal and some adjustment may be necessary so that he does 
not recover fees attributable to issues on which he did not 
prevail. See id. at 556 n.10. On the other hand, "while not 
enjoying total success on this appeal," Wright is properly 
regarded as the party who prevailed on appeal and "is entitled 
on remand to an award of [his] attorney fees reasonably incurred 
on appeal." I&. at 557. See id. at 557 n.ll. We accordingly 
remand for further consideration of attorney fees and for such 
further proceedings and relief as may be appropriate in that 
regard. See generally Halladay v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643, 645 n.5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
Humphries failed to prove fraud against Wright and we 
therefore reverse the $38,582.00 award. The trial court should 
have exonerated the injunction bond upon the proper motion of 
Wright and, thus, we remand to the trial court for appropriate 
relief in this respect. We also remand to the trial court for 
11. The jury instruction regarding attorney fees was broader 
than the provision in the Purchase Agreement which only provided 
for recovery of fees to the prevailing party who was "enforcing 
performance of any covenant or representation hereunder or for 
damages for breach thereof." The instruction given allowed the 
jury to award fees to the party who prevailed in the action. 
Neither party objected to this instruction and both thereby 
acquiesced in the instruction as given. Nor did either party 
object to having the jury make the attorney fee decision, a 
matter ordinarily better entrusted to the court. 
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further consideration of attorney fees. As to the other issues 
raised on appeal, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
GARY W. PENDLETON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
150 North Second East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Ph: 628-4411 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah 
limited partnership and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an 
individual, 
Defendant. 
BILL OF COSTS 
Civil No. 85-0536 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 34(c) and Rule 34(d), 
R. Utah Ct. App., Plaintiff presents the following Memorandum of 
Costs incurred on the appeal in the above-entitled action: 
Appeal filing fee (District Court) $ 30.00 
Docketing fee (Court of Appeals) 
Transcript cost 
Printing of Exhibits incorporated 
into Appellant's brief 
Printing and binding briefs 
Bond premiums incurred during 
pendency on appeal 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON) 
Gary W. Pendleton, being first duly sworn upon oath 
deposes and says that he is the attorney for the Plaintiff in the 
above-entitled action and as such is better informed relative to 
the above costs and disbursements than the said Defendant; that the 
items contained in the memorandum are true and correct to the best 
of affiant's knowledge and belief and that said disbursements have 
been necessarily incurred in said action. 
DATED this I day of March, 1990-
r W. Pendleton 
£li 
Gary
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON) 
7 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '__ day of March, 
1990/ by Gary W^^«Bld3$±pn who personally appeared before and 
executed the fosnoiirftf?dQcfenent. 
6 &£_ 
OTARY PUBLIC 
©siding at St. George, Utah 
My Commission 
5' 3 ^  97y****** 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this 7 day of March, 
1990, I did personally mail a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing Memorandum to Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney at Law, 
P. 0. Box 726, Cedar City, Utah &4721. 
Secretary (f 
GARY W. PENDLETON USB #2564 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
150 North Second East, Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Ph: 628-4411 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE RONALD WRIGHT, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
WESTSIDE NURSERY, a Utah ] 
limited partnership and 
DARREL HUMPHRIES, an ] 
individual, 
Defendant. 
| ORDER ASSESSING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL, | DIRECTING DISBURSEMENTS OF 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND 
> EXONERATING PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION BOND 
> Civil No. 85-0536 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on Plaintiff's motion to reduce the attorney's fees awarded to 
Defendants at trial and to assess attorney's fees reasonably 
incurred on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiff 
appeared in person and by and through his attorney, Gary W. 
Pendleton and Defendants appeared by and through their attorney, 
Hans Q. Chamberlain. The Court having heard the statements of 
counsel and having taken evidence regarding the issue of attorney's 
fees and having reviewed the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and being fully advised in the premises entered the following 
orders: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
attorney's fees awarded Defendants at trial are not reduced because 
'oorifr ?? nn 1023 
1 
the jury was not requested to disclose the basis of their award of 
the attorney's fees and the Court is not going to speculate in that 
area. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff recover from Defendant the sum of $8,152.50 as 
reimbursement for attorney's fees reasonably incurred on appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals, the Court having found the same to be 
reasonably and necessarily incurred. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff recover no costs on 
appeal and his Bill of Costs filed on March 7, 1990, is hereby 
stricken. This order is made on the grounds and for the reasons 
that the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals does not specifically 
award Plaintiff costs on appeal and such costs are not recoverable 
by application of Rule 34, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District 
Court immediately disburse the funds now held as supersedeas bond 
in the above-entitled matter from which the sum of $26,314.72 shall 
be paid over to the Defendants and their attorney, Hans Q. 
Chamberlain, and the balance of which shall be paid over to the 
Plaintiff and his attorney, Gary W. Pendleton. 
The amount due Defendants is calculated by beginning with 
the $20,198.21 awarded to Defendants as reimbursement for that 
portion of the $30,000.00 loan which made its way into the Westside 
Nursery Account and was used to pay obligations for which Plaintiff 
was ultimately responsible. To that sum is added the attorney's 
fees awarded Defendants at trial. 
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From this sum is subtracted the attorney's fees Plaintiff 
incurred on appeal. 
Post Judgment interest (589 days at 12% per annum) is 
added to the adjusted award. 
Expressed mathematically: 
Items awarded Defendants: 
Reimbursement $20,198.21 
Attorney's Fees awarded Defendants 
(not modified) 10,000.00 
TOTAL AWARD $30,198.21 
Adjustments: 
Costs on appeal (none awarded) -0-
Attorney's Fees awarded Plaintiff 
on appeal $8,152.50 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS -8,152.50 
ADJUSTED AWARD $22,045.71 
Post Judgment Interest $4,269.01 
TOTAL DISBURSEMENT TO DEFENDANT $26,314*72 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that upon 
disbursement of the supersedeas bond as more specifically set forth 
above, all monetary judgments entered by this Court in the above-
entitled action shall be fully satisfied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
preliminary injunction bond in the amount of $50,000.00 posted by 
3 
the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action is hereby exonerated and 
the surety is discharged. 
DATED this 9^^- day of March, 1990 
J. Jphilip Eve 
District Judge 
^£ppxpvedr as to~form and extent: 
Han^ Q. Chamberlain 
4 
